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REDEFINING INSIDER DEALING LAW FOR EMERGING 
MARKETS: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY
Dr. Kenneth Kaoma Mwenda
Advocate of the High Court for Zambia. Lecturer in Law in the University of Warwick
The collapse of the so-called communist regimes in eastern Europe and the ending of the 
cold war have had a significant bearing on the relationships of various subjects of 
international law. Indeed, not only has the international community witnessed the winds 
of change in power relations, but also the international community has seen major shifts in 
patterns of capital formation and relations. We have seen, for example, how through the 
structural adjustment programmes and the stabilisation packages, international financiers 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have exerted socio-economic 
and political pressure on developing countries.1 Indeed, in many developing countries 
where donor instigated economic reforms are being carried out, privatisation and related 
economic policies such as those on the setting up of stock markets in these countries have 
been proposed by the international financiers.2 In this paper, it is the efficacy of some of the 
important legal rules and structures for regulating public distribution of securities on 
emerging stock markets that are examined. In pursuing this discourse, we will look at two 
case studies. One case study is taken from Africa and the other from eastern Europe. These 
two regions represent geographical areas where stock markets are now beginning to emerge, 
mainly as facilitators of the massive privatisations in the regions. In the study, we will thus 
look at the efficacy of the laws on insider dealing in Zambia and in Hungary, and then 
provide an analysis of the theories underpinning the control of insider dealing generally.
Insider dealing law in Zambia was first introduced in 1993 when the Securities Act 1993 
was enacted. Section 52 of the Securities Act 1993 spells out the statute law that prohibits 
insider dealing in Zambia. The Securities Act 1993 is one of the pieces of legislation which 
were hastily enacted to facilitate implementation of the structural adjustment programme 
in Zambia.3 Indeed, a stock market has now been established in Zambia and it is fully 
operational.
That said, it must be observed that there are some critics who argue that insider dealing is 
a 'victimless crime' in that it is not clear if there is actually a loser.4 Others claim that the 
practice of insider dealing increases the volume of sales on a market, so that overall the 
market gains.5 Indeed, the disparity in these views is buttressed by empirical evidence 
showing that in the United Kingdom, for example, by 1995 there were less than fifty 
convictions from the time the offence was introduced.6 By contrast, the case of Zambia
1 There is an abundance of literature on this. See also generally, infra, (n.2).
2 See K.K. Mwenda, "Zambia's Securities Act 1993 on Trial: The Case of Insider Dealing," Statute Law 
Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, (1997), p. 150. See also K.K. Mwenda, "The Securities Act 1993 of Zambia: A 
Comment On The Defective Provisions For Controlling Insider Dealing in Zambia," Stellenbosch Law 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, (1997), p. 225.
3 Other statutes include the Privatisation Act 1992, the Investment Act 1991 (now repealed and replaced 
by the Investment Act 1993), and the Investment Act 1993.
4 See J. Dine, Criminal Law in The Company Context (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995), p. 57.
5 See Ibid., p. 57.
6 See Ibid., p. 58.
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presents an even more interesting situation. In Zambia, like in many other developing 
countries, there have been no convictions of insider dealing at all.7 We shall examine later 
some of the theoretical issues underpinning the offence of insider dealing.
THE LAW ON INSIDER DEALING IN ZAMBIA
In Zambia, the principal piece of legislation which deals with insider dealing is the Securities 
Act 1993. Indeed, in many ways this statute reinforces rules of the common law on contracts 
and tort. The Securities Act 1993 attempts to address the law on insider dealing in one 
statutory provision. This section reads as follows:
(1) A person to whom this section applies who deals, or counsels or procures 
another to deal, in securities of a company concerning which he has any 
knowledge that:
(a) is not publicly available; and
(b) would, if it were publicly available, materially affect the price of the securities. . .
(2) This section applies to:
(a) any director, officer or employee of the company concerned;
(b) any person associated in a professional capacity with that company; and
(c) any person who obtains such information from any of the persons mentioned
in paragraph (a) or (b).
(3) No dealing shall be void or voidable by reason only that it was entered into in 
contravention of this section.8
The above statutory provision covers two types of insider dealers. Paragraphs 2(a) and (b) 
relate to primary insiders whereas paragraph 2(c) relates to secondary insiders. Although 
the law on insider dealing in Zambia covers both primary and secondary insider dealers, 
it fails to address the liability of third parties who obtain and use information from secondary 
insider dealers. In addition, the Securities Act 1993 does not provide any statutory defences 
to the offence of insider dealing. Also, whereas government securities such as bonds can 
be traded on a securities market in Zambia,9 insider dealing law applies only to company 
securities. The latter shortcoming is evident in the range of securities covered by section 52 
of the Securities Act 1993 which deals with insider dealing in Zambia.10
It is clear that in drafting the Securities Act 1993, neither the draftsman nor the members of 
parliament (when debating the Securities Bill 1993) took into account the shortcomings 
highlighted above.11 One of the major factors that could have led to this development is 
that there were not many Zambian corporate finance lawyers that were involved in 
preparing the Securities Bill 1993.12 Even today, with an expanding financial sector, Zambia
7 Interview  with Mr. C. Mate, Chief Executive, Lusaka Stock Exchange, Lusaka, 20th December 1996.
8 Securities Act 1993, sec. 52.
9 See generally Part 1 of the Securities Act 1993 and, in particular, section 2 of that Act.
10 For a text of section 52 of the Securities Act 1993, see above.
11 See infra, (n.6). See also Daily Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Thursday, 29th July 1993 (Lusaka: The 
National Assembly, 1993), pp. 545-549.
12 Originally, interview with B. Ngenda, then Chairman of the Zambia Stock Exchanges Council (Lusaka, 
23rd August, 1993): B. Ngenda gave an indication that he had drafted the Securities Bill 1993. However, 
in a recent reply from the Chief Executive of the Securities Exchange Commission, M. Kapumpa, to a 
newspaper article by this author (see K.K. Mwenda's article in Financial Mail o f Zambia, 2nd April, 
1996) it was argued by the Chief Executive that the Securities Bill 1993 was drafted by experts in the 
field of securities regulation from various countries which included the United States and the United 
Kingdom; see M. Kapumpa's article in Sunday Times o f Zambia, 11th April 1996. Furthermore, in a 
discussion with E. Chipimo Jr., then Secretary of the ad hoc committee on overseeing the establishment
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has a handful of corporate finance law experts and specialists.13 We now turn to look at the 
salient features of insider dealing law in Hungary. We will make critical comparisons and 
contrasts with aspects of the law in Zambia.
Looking at securities law in Hungary, we see that under that country's Securities and Stock 
Exchange Act V I 1990, paragraph 75 provides that:
(1) It is forbidden to deal using confidential insider information, and those who have 
confidential insider information are prohibited from dealing personally or by proxy 
(hereinafter: insider dealing) or in connection with the securities involved.
(2) Confidential insider information relating to the financial, economic and legal 
situations of the Issuer, Broker and W arrantor: If changes are likely to occur in 
their situation, then in these cases the confidential insider information's publication 
may affect substantially the value of securities, in particular to new issues, major 
deals, structural changes, turn-round projects and winding up.
It is clear from the above statutory provision that insider dealing law in Hungary, like that 
in Zambia, emphasises that in order for a person to be convicted of the offence of insider 
dealing his conduct must have affected the value of the securities. The drafting and scope 
of the Zambian statute and the Hungarian statute, however, differ to some extent. Whereas 
section 52 of the Zambian Securities Act 1993 stipulates that the insider's conduct must 
'materially affect the price of the securities', paragraph 75 of the Hungarian Securities and 
Stock Exchange Act VI 1990 provides that the insider's conduct must 'affect substantially 
the value of securities.' What is deemed 'substantially' under Hungarian law has not been 
spelt out in the Hungarian Act. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the words 'substantially' 
and 'materially' mean the same thing. The same applies to words such as 'value' and 'price'.
The Zambian statute, like its Hungarian counterpart (for the latter statute with regard to 
the term 'substantially'), has no definition of the term 'materially'. It must be observed, 
however, that the Hungarian statute, unlike the Zambian statute, goes further to confine 
liability of insider dealing to new issues of securities, major deals, structural changes, turn- 
round projects and winding up. The Hungarian statute does not, however, define what 
constitutes major deals, structural changes or turn-round projects.
of the Lusaka Stock Exchange (Lusaka: 30th August 1993), E. Chipimo submitted that most of the 
provisions in the Securities Bill 1993 of Zambia were drawn from legislation in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. It is, however, doubtful that there was any major input from 
the local specialists on the subject since at that time the two Zambians who were qualified corporate 
finance lawyers and who were actively involved in the setting up of the Lusaka Stock Exchange were 
the then Chairman of the Zambia Stock Exchanges Council, Mr. B. Ngenda and Mr. E. Chipimo Jr. 
himself. Mr. E. Chipimo Jr. made clear indications that he was not involved in the drafting of the 
Securities Bill 1993. Indeed, this evidence helps to explain why the Securities Act 1993 appears to 
have been drafted in a way that indicates that there was no thoughtful consideration given to some of 
the shortcomings in that Act (and shortcomings in related Zambian commercial law statutes e.g. 
there was no definition of who is a 'director',in Zambia's Companies Act 1921. For further discussions, 
see below).
13 Generally, the reasons for this are twofold. First, the University of Zambia Law School, which is the 
only Law School in the country, does not offer courses on corporate finance law. Secondly, since 
Zambia attained political independence, Zambia's financial sector has remained predominantly 
underdeveloped. It is only recently that other forms of corporate financing such as raising finance on 
a stock market are being explored in Zambia. This feature entails that there are not many local lawyers 
and accountants who could have gained substantial experience in the area of securities regulation in 
Zambia. However, in his reply to this author's newspaper article (see above), the Chief Executive of 
the Securities Exchange Commission argued that there are now efforts to get the University of Zambia 
Law School to introduce a course on securities regulation in Zambia.
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Having said that, it is important to observe that paragraph 77 of the Hungarian statute 
defines insider dealing as:
Insider dealing made by an insider for his own or for a third person's benefit
a) deals in securities related to insider confidential information,
b) deals by proxy of another person in such securities,
c) divulges insider information to whomever may be likely to benefit from such 
knowledge or pass on within the Stock Exchange.
By comparison, it is clear that whereas section 52 of the Zambian legislation on insider 
dealing covers only liability of primary and secondary insiders, paragraph 76 of the 
Hungarian legislation covers liability not only of primary and secondary insider but also 
that of close relatives of various persons such as the chief executive of the issuer; close 
relatives of the executive officers of the issuer; close relatives of any legal person owning a 
major interest in the issuer and close relatives of the bank that keeps the issuer's account. 
The Hungarian Act does not, however, define what is meant by 'close relatives.' 
Furthermore, this Act is somewhat not clear on the liability of other third parties who 
engage in insider dealing. It could, however, be argued that in situations where a person is 
seen as falling in the close relative category and this person is a third party, then he or she 
can be liable as an insider under Hungarian law.
The Hungarian Act goes on to say:
(1) Qualified Insiders are:
a) chief executives and executive officers of Issuer, Issue-Broker, of any legal 
person (corporation) that owns a major interest in Issuer, as defined in the 
Company Act para 322, and of the bank that keeps Issuer's account;
b) close relatives of those listed in (a) above/C ivil Code p ara 685 b ) / ;
c) those who own f 0 percent or more of Issuer's authorised capital, and the 
close relatives of the natural person/C ivil Code para 685 b ) / ;
d) those w ho within the last six m onths have o r had been em ployed or 
estab lish ed  an y  kind o f c lo se  w o rk in g -co n tact w ith th e Issu er —  
independently of whether they are natural or legal persons —  in a capacity  
giving them access to confidential inside information (such as auditors, legal 
advisors, tax consultants).
(2) And anybody else enumerated over in (f) to whom handed over confidential 
information or obtained that in any kind of manner and who has knowingly had 
access to confidential inside information.14
Whereas sub-section (1) of the above statutory provision is well drafted and it is easy to 
follow,15 sub-section (2) is somewhat very poorly drafted. For arguments sake, we submit 
that sub-section (2) provides for liability of third parties who deal or advise others or procure 
others to deal in securities using inside information obtained from either primary insiders 
or secondary insiders, or both. Persons described in the above statutory provision (i.e. 
paragraph 76 of the Hungarian statute) constitute the categories of potential insider dealers 
under the Hungarian law. Thus, we see that the Hungarian law is much more encompassing 
than the Zambian law where categories of potential insiders are concerned.
14 Hungary's Securities and Stock Exchange Act VI 1990, paragraph 76. ■
15 Major aspects of the law in paragraph (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) have been examined above. 
Paragraph (d) applies to persons who could have acted as professionals dealing with the company or 
any persons who could have been employees of the company in the six months prior to the offence.
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Insider Dealing Law and Civil Remedies
Both in the Hungarian and Zambian statutes, the objective of insider law has not been 
spelt out clearly. There is need to address this factor. For example, it would be interesting 
to ask whether insider dealing law in Zambia is meant to protect investors from market 
abuses or it is meant to punish persons convicted of insider dealing. If the law on insider 
dealing in Zambia is meant to protect investors from market abuses, then investor protection 
and investor confidence in the market must be primary considerations of the law.16 If, on 
the other hand, insider dealing law in Zambia addresses only criminal sanctions against 
convicted insidef dealers, then investor protection is not the main concern of the Securities 
Act 1993. In Hungary, paragraph 80 of the Hungarian Act merely places the onus on the 
insider (himself) to report his activities to the regulatory authority and also to the stock 
exchange:
Those who under para 76(1) are deemed insiders shall immediately report to the 
Supervisory Board and to the Stock Exchange whenever they make or made a deal 
personally or by proxy, in a Security issued by corporations where they were —  
according to p ara 76(1) —  in a position to gain access to confidential insider 
information.17
This position poses a lot of illogical difficulties. It is arguable whether an insider could 
volunteer himself up and report his activities to the regulatory authority and to the stock 
exchange. There has to be a great incentive that outweighs the costs of the insider giving 
himself up. However, we submit that, perhaps, what could have been intended by the 
draftsman in drafting this statutory provision was that if a party was of the view that it 
could be deemed that he was going to act as an insider, the onus was on that party to make 
a disclosure of his activities to the regulatory authority and to the stock exchange. Once 
that was done, then the disclosing party would be exempted from liability. This position 
has, nonetheless, not been well put in the Hungarian Securities and Stock Exchange Act.
It must be observed further that although the Hungarian Securities and Stock Exchange 
Act does not spell out the penalties to be faced by parties that are convicted of the offence 
of insider dealing, in many civil law countries the bulk of statute law providing for criminal 
sanctions is covered in a separate piece of legislation. This approach differs from that found 
in many common law jurisdictions.18 In Zambia, the Securities Act 1993 itself provides for 
criminal sanctions. As shown above, under section 52 of the Zambian Securities Act 1993, 
penalties for engaging in insider dealing are found in that statutory provision. It must be 
observed, however, that although the Zambian Securities Act 1993 does provide for criminal 
sanctions against convicted insiders, it does not provide for civil remedies to parties
16 This feature underlies the concept of market efficiency of stock markets. For an elaborate read on 
'strong form' efficiency, 'semi-strong form' efficiency and 'weak form' efficiency, see R.A. Brealey 
and S.C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), pp. 290-297; E.W. 
Davis and J. Pointon, Finance and the Firm: An Introduction to Corporate Finance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp. 319-322; P.H Cootner (ed.). Random Character of Stock Market Prices 
(Cambridge, Massa.: M.I.T Press, 1964), pp. 17-78; Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of 
Theory and Empirical Work," fournal of Finance, 2 5 /2  (May 1970), 343-417; Roberts, "Stock Market 
'Patterns' and Financial Analysis: Methodological Suggestions," fournal of Finance, 14 (March 1959), 
1- 10 .
17 Hungarian Securities and Stock Exchanges Act V I1990, paragraph 80.
18 Although it is common practice in many common law jurisdictions to have penal codes or other 
criminal law statutes, these pieces of legislation do not provide exhaustive sources of statute law on 
crime. Certainly, in many common law jurisdictions other criminal laws can be found in various 
statutes such as the Companies Act, Income Tax Act, the Securities Act and so forth.
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prejudiced by insider dealing. Furthermore, although section 54 of the Zambian Securities 
Act 1993 provides that civil action can be brought against any person convicted of an offence 
under Part VII of the Act, the section does not provide for specific civil remedies to a party 
prejudiced by insider dealing. Indeed, section 54 of the Securities Act 1993 provides as 
follows:
(1) A person who is convicted of an offence under this Part shall, in addition to any 
criminal liability for the offence, be liable, at the suit of-any person who has 
sustained pecuniary loss as a result of having purchased or sold securities at a 
price affected by the act or transaction which comprises or is the subject of the 
offence, to an action of damages in respect of the loss concerned.
(2) Nothing in this section limits or diminishes any civil liability which any person  
may incur under any other law.
The above statutory provision in the Zambian statute adds very little to the common law. 
The section simply introduces further complications. First, an action for civil remedies in 
Zambia, against an insider, can only be brought under section 54 of the Securities Act 1993 
after the insider has been convicted of a criminal offence under Part VII of that Act. Thus, 
an insider cannot be made liable for civil wrongs relating to insider dealing unless he has 
been convicted of a criminal offence under Part VII of the Securities Act 1993.19 Part VII 
covers criminal offences such as insider dealing, false trading and manipulation of the 
market, use of deceptive statements (or dishonest concealments) as inducements, fraudulent 
transactions and false or misleading statements in connection with sale of securities. 
However, our concern here is with the offence of insider dealing. Given the shortcomings 
of section 52 of the Zambian Securities Act 1993, as shown above, it could be submitted 
that the prospects of a prejudiced party receiving civil remedies as a form of investor 
protection under the Zambian Securities Act 1993 are quite remote. Secondly, section 54 of 
the Zambian Securities Act 1993 mainly stresses the aspect of damages as a form of civil 
remedies under the Act. The section does not make provision for statutory compensation. 
Although damages are a form of compensation, the amount of damages granted will often 
be limited by factors such as causation, remoteness, and mitigation rules.20 By contrast, an 
explicit provision in the Securities Act 1993 spelling out the liability to compensate a 
prejudiced party will not necessarily be approached by the courts in the same manner that 
the court will approach damages at common law.
Having said that, we are mindful of the fact that section 54(2) of the Zambian Securities 
Act 1993 does make provision for a prejudiced party to seek equitable remedies provided 
that legislation does not state otherwise. To illustrate, although restitution can be sought 
under Zambian securities law, a contract vitiated by insider dealing may not be rescinded.21 
This position is discussed in detail later in this work. Under section 54 of the Zambian 
Securities Act 1993, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the defendant has committed a civil wrong against the plaintiff and the 
latter is now entitled to civil remedies. It must be observed that some of the important 
reasons for observing that there is need t6 have civil remedies expressly provided for in
19 This makes the pursuit of civil remedies for insider dealing conditional upon there being a criminal 
law conviction. It is our humble submission here that permission to pursue any civil remedies for 
insider dealing in future must be made independent of the criminal law so that investor confidence 
in the Zambian market is sustained.
20 See generally, A. Burrows, Remedies For Torts and Breach of Contract, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 
1994).
21 See below.
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the Securities Act 1993 are that whereas the burden of proof in criminal law lies on the 
prosecution (and not on the party suffering loss), the burden of proof in civil law cases lies 
on the plaintiff (the party suffering loss). In civil cases, unlike in criminal cases, the 
prejudiced party can recover damages for the loss he has suffered.22 Hence, it is submitted 
that in civil cases, compensation (or restitution of parties where possible) of the prejudiced 
party is an important consideration.23 Furthermore, whereas the standard of proof in 
criminal cases is that of beyond reasonable doubt, the standard of proof in civil cases is 
based on a balance of probabilities. Indeed, in civil cases the standard of proof is lower 
than that in criminal cases.
Liability of Companies and de facto Directors
In Zambia, the Companies Act 1994 provides that:
A person not being duly appointed director of a company, on whose directions or 
instructions the duly appointed directors are accustomed to act shall be deemed to be 
a director for the purposes of all duties and liabilities imposed on d irectors.. .24
The above provision has made improvements to the law on directors' liability and directors' 
duties in Zambia. The provision introduces the concept of shadow director in Zambian 
company law. Under the repealed Companies Act 1921 and under the Securities Act 1993, 
the concept of shadow director was not (and is not) covered. As Goode argues, a shadow 
director in contrast to a de facto director, normally acts through a de jure (legally appointed 
director),25 whereas a de facto director acts as director although he has not been (or not 
validly) appointed as such. Thus, a de facto director, in contrast to a shadow director, acts 
himself as if he were a director.
It is, however, clear that before the enactment of the Companies Act 1994 in Zambia, no 
person 'materially' influencing decisions of a company's board of directors (from outside 
the company) could be made liable as a shadow director. This in turn meant that under the 
Securities Act 1993, no person acting as a shadow director and releasing inside information 
to investors could be made liable as an insider. The reason was simple. Until the enactment 
of the Companies Act 1994, such a person would not be treated as a director under corporate 
law in Zambia. As pointed out above, the coming into force of the Companies Act 1994 
introduced the concept of shadow director. Indeed, the concept of shadow director now 
applies to the law on insider dealing in Zambia as much as it applies to company law in 
Zambia. And so, when determining who is and who is not a company director in Zambia 
for purposes of interpreting the statutory provision on insider dealing in Zambia, the 
concept of shadow director, as established by section 203(4) of the Companies Act 1994, 
applies to securities law. One shortcoming here is that the Zambian Securities Act 1993 
does not stipulate the length of time for which a person could be said to have been acting
22 See generally, D. Harris, Remedies in Contract and Tort (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1988); G. 
Samuel and J. Rinkes, Law of Obligations and Legal Remedies (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd.,
1996) .
23 See generally, Ibid.
24 Companies Act 1994, sec. 203(4).
25 See R.M. Goode, Principles o f Corporate Insolvency Law, 1st ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1990), 
pp. 196-197; R.M. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell,
1997) , pp. 443-456; See also generally, P. Loose, J. Yelland and D. Impey, The Company Director (Bristol: 
Jordans Publishing Ltd. 1993). A shadow, contrasted from a de facto who normally acts in person, acts 
through someone.
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as a director so as to be held liable for insider dealing. By contrast, the Hungarian Securities 
and Stock Exchange Act V I 1990 provides that:
If an insider as defined in paragraph 76(1) a) and b) [see above] resells a Security 
within three months to the person he had purchased it from, or purchases it back 
from the person he had sold it to, he should be presumed to have committed insider 
dealing, except in the case of him proving that confidential information was not 
available.26
There is no such equivalence in the Zambian Securities Act 1993. Indeed, paragraph 79 of 
the Hungarian securities legislation spells out the time limit for which a person can be said 
to be engaging in insider dealing. The law in Hungary goes on further to provide exemptions 
from liability for engaging in insider dealing. Paragraph 79 of the Hungarian statute 
provides as follows:
The transaction shall not be deemed an insider dealing if the insider can prove that
a) he had to sell the Security as Liquidator to pay creditors,
b) the transaction was concluded with a person who had the same inside knowledge 
available.
However, it must be pointed out that had the Zambian Securities Act 1993 incorporated a 
similar provision, there would have been need to ensure that each time sub-paragraph a) 
of the above provision was relied upon, the liquidator did not act in breach of insolvency 
laws such as those prohibiting transactions at an undervalue and preferences to creditors.27
In Zambia, bodies corporate are excluded from the two categories of insiders covered by 
section 52 of the Securities Act 1993.28 29To reiterate, section 52(1) of the Securities Act 1993 
provides that:
(1) A person to whom this section applies who deals, or counsels or procures another 
to deal, in securities of a company concerning which he has any knowledge that:
(a) is not publicly available; and
(b) would, if it were publicly available, materially affect the price of the securities
In the above section, the pronoun 'he' obviously refers to individuals. The above statutory 
provision is drafted in such a way that companies ceased with inside information cannot 
be trapped under insider dealing law in Zambia. By comparison, the Hungarian statute 
also adopts similar wording and provides that:
Insider dealing made by an insider for his own or for a third person's benefit. . . ”
Thus, although in Zambia bodies corporate such as merchant banks and those acting as 
underwriters, promoters and operators of collective investment schemes could benefit from 
this weakness in the law, in Hungary, by contrast, the position is not necessarily the same. 
Under Hungarian securities legislation, bodies corporate are caught up by paragraph 76 of 
the Hungarian Securities and Stock Exchange Act V I1990. This statutory provision defines 
who are insider persons. Among other targets, the provision identifies natural and legal 
persons as being potential insiders. The major distinctions, however, between the Hungarian 
legal position and the Zambian legal position is that whereas under Hungarian securities
26 Hungarian Securities and Stock Exchange Act V I1990, paragraph 78.
27 Cf. The Zambian Companies Act 1994, sec. 277.
28 In section 52(1) of the Securities Act 1993, the pronoun 'he' obviously refers to individuals.
29 See Hungarian Securities and Stock Exchange Act VI 1990, paragraph 77.
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legislation the conduct of a proxy would place liability on the principal,30 unde^Zambian 
securities legislation the position is somewhat not clear. Thus in Zambia, the general position 
remains that companies, unlike partnerships, cannot be made criminally liable nor their 
directors made criminally liable where other employees acting in the course of business 
engage in insider dealing. Only the individual wrongdoers will be made criminally liable. 
This is the case regardless of whether the company dealt in, counseled parties or procured 
them to deal in securities. Again, one of the major factors that explain weaknesses in the 
law here is the lack of corporate finance law experts among parliamentary draftsmen.31 
Indeed, it is not even clear whether insider dealing law provisions under the Zambian 
Securities Act 1993 are restricted to stock market dealings or they also cover dealings off 
the stock market.32
It would, however, be over-stretching the law on insider dealing in Zambia to try to bring 
liability on company directors under section 77 of the Zambian Securities Act 1993 which, 
among other things, provides for criminal liability of company directors for the company's 
breach of regulatory rules made pursuant to provisions of the Securities Act 1993. Section 
77 provides that:
If a body corporate is convicted of an offence against this Act or the rules or regulation 
made under this Act, every person:
(a) who is a director of the corporation; or
(b) who is concerned in the management of the corporation, shall be deemed to 
have committed the same offence if the person knowingly authorised or 
permitted the act or omission constituting the offence.
It would also be inappropriate to bring liability of insider dealing on company directors or 
officers under section 77 of the Zambian Securities Act 1993, which deals in part with 
liability of company directors who breach provisions of the Securities Act 1993. Under 
section 77, two cardinal elements must be shown. First, it must be shown that there was 
conviction of a body corporate and not an individual. Secondly, there is the issue of 
overcoming the burden of proof that a director 'knowingly' authorised or permitted the 
act or omission in question. The Zambian Securities Act 1993 does not define what 
constitutes 'knowingly.' We shall examine the term 'knowingly' later.
Be that as it may, it must be observed that the Securities Act 1993 in Zambia does not 
exclude members of unincorporated associations (e.g. partners in a partnership) from the 
two categories of potential insider dealers.33 We have already examined this point above 
and here we are developing it further. Under Zambian insider dealing law, there is need to 
show that partners or their delegates either procured parties to deal in securities, counseled 
them on the dealings or dealt in securities using inside information obtained from primary 
insiders. The partnership position mainly affects lawyers and accountants in Zambia. 
Indeed, in Zambia, these two professions normally organise their business in the form of 
partnerships. Usually, where lawyers or accountants are not acting as financial 
intermediaries on the stock market, they will be acting in a professional capacity with the
30 Ibid., paragraph 77 b).
31 See above.
32 For example some of the dealings made pursuant to provisions of the Privatisation Act 1992.
33 In Zambia, the English Partnership Act 1890 and the common law govern partnership law. There are 
no partnerships with limited liability of partners.
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alloting company or the buyer.34 Such professional capacity could include advising directors 
of the alloting company (or the buyer) on financial or legal matters affecting the company. 
This brings lawyers and accountants closer to provisions of the Zambian Securities Act 
1993 on insider dealing. Thus, in the latter two capacities described above, lawyers and 
accountants are likely to be treated as shadow directors35 and thus making them potential 
insiders. Indeed, to be triggered, section 52 of the Zambian Securities Act 1993 does not 
require proof that the recipient of inside information (the insider) asked for the information. 
Insider dealing liability covers use of unsolicited inside information.36 The shortcoming, 
however, is that the law in Zambia does not say when the insider must be seen to have 
acquired the inside information. By contrast, Hungarian securities legislation, places a six 
months period as that in which inside information must have been acquired.37
Liability of Journalists as Insider Dealers38
Generally, under Zambian insider dealing law, newspaper proprietors, publishers and non­
employees of companies (e.g. shareholders who are not directors) cannot be held liable 
where they use inside information obtained from secondary insiders. Thus, the Securities 
Act 1993 does not prohibit journalists from publishing inside information and thereby 
obtaining tips from parties interested in that information. Also, receiving inside information 
from journalists and acting on it is not an offence under the Securities Act 1993. Journalists 
can get away here without contravening the law because the information they have passed 
on to their customers has not been obtained from a primary insider, but from a secondary 
insider. In Zambia, to avoid such weaknesses in the law, the Securities Act 1993 must provide 
that any person who knowingly transmits or receives and acts on inside information, 
irrespective of the manner in which the information was acquired, should be liable both 
under civil and criminal law. The Act must also spell out what constitutes 'knowingly' in 
both the civil law context and the criminal law context.
Are Intermediaries Professionals as Required by Insider Dealing Law?
Generally, financial intermediaries per se are neither professionals nor persons acting in a 
professional capacity with the company buying or selling the securities.39 If this view is
34 Here, this view seems to underlie the policy bases of introducing paragraph 76 (1) d) in the Hungarian 
Securities and Stock Exchange Act VI 1990. That statutory provision stipulates as follows: "those 
who within the last six months have or had been employed or established any kind of close working- 
contact with the Issuer — independently of whether they are natural or legal persons — in a capacity 
giving them access to confidential inside information (such as auditors, legal advisors, tax 
consultants)."
35 See Re A Company (No. 00509 of 1987\ [1988] BCC 424; Re Tasbian Ltd. (No.3\ [1992] BCC 358.
36 See Re Attorney General’s Reference [1989] 2 All ER. 1.
37 See Hungarian Securities and Stock Exchange Act V I1990, paragraphs 76 d) and 78.
38 See generally Re Company Securities (Insider Dealing) [1988] BCLC 76. In this case, it is likely that the 
journalist would have been held liable for insider dealing had the case been decided after Part V of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1994 had come into force. See also Re Insider Dealing Inquiry [1988] BCLC 153.
39 See Christopher Barker & Sons v. IRC [1919] 2 KB. 222. It is the author's contention that professionals 
and persons acting in professional capacities have monopoly over their trade and skill e.g. surgeon, 
lawyer, accountant etc. On the other hand, upon authorization, any person can practise as a broker. 
Fora contrary view on the position whether or not financial intermediaries are professionals or act in 
professional capacities, Discussion with Professor D.D. Prentice, Oxford University, Oxford, 25th 
October 1993, showed that he is of the view that brokers and other financial intermediaries act in 
professional capacities. This view could be true in a situation such as that obtaining under section 59
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correct, as we contend, then it can be argued that financial intermediaries are not covered 
by the provision on primary insider dealers in the Zambian Securities Act 1993. The view 
that financial intermediaries do not carry out a professional task when acting in their 
ordinary course of business was spelt out in the English case of Christopher Barker & Sons v. 
IRC.40 In that case, the appellants carried on business of stockbrokers, buying and selling 
stocks and shares on the market for clients, being remunerated by commission. They were 
also consulted professionally on the promotion of and the alterations and adjustments of 
capital in commercial undertakings, and they also made valuation of stocks and shares 
forming part of the estates of deceased persons, being remunerated for such advice and 
valuations by fee. It was held that stockbrokers in buying stocks and shares do not carry 
on a profession and that the work of advice and valuation for which the appellants were 
remunerated by fees was done as part of and in connection with their business as 
stockbrokers and not in the exercise of a profession, and that therefore the appellants were 
liable to excess profits duty.
The consequences of the Christopher case in Zambia are that financial intermediaries per $e 
are not professionals and do not act in a professional capacity when they are acting in their 
ordinary course of business. It must be pointed out, however, that in other countries this 
position has been reversed by legislation.41 In Zambia, although financial intermediaries 
per se cannot be regarded as professionals or as acting in a professional capacity with 
investors, rule 28 of the Securities (Conduct of Business) Rules 1993 prohibits financial 
intermediaries from using inside information obtained from their employees, officers and 
agents. We now turn to look at what constitutes 'materially affecting the price of securities' 
and what constitutes 'knowingly' under insider dealing law in Zambia.
What Constitutes ‘Materiality’ and ‘Knowledge’ in Insider Dealing Law?
Under section 52 of the Zambian Securities Act 1993, it is clear that one of the essential 
characteristics that must be satisfied before news is taken to be inside information is that 
that information must 'materially' affect the price of the securities. We saw earlier on that 
the Hungarian securities legislation uses similar terminology, namely, the adjective 
'substantially' affect the price of the securities. In Zambia, the other requirement to prove 
insider dealing is that the information must not have been publicly available at the time of 
communicating and dealing in it. A similar approach is seen in the Hungarian securities 
legislation and in that Act the phrase 'confidential information' is used to define the 
attributes of insider dealing.42 In Zambia, as was pointed out earlier, the criterion of defining 
what constitutes 'materially (or materiality)' has not been spelt out in the Securities Act 
1993. It is also doubtful whether fraudulent omissions43 that create inflated prices of 
securities could amount to insider dealing. Moreover, the weakness of the local currency
of England's Criminal Justice Act 1994, where the label 'professional intermediary' is used and also 
that prevailing under paragraph 76 of the Hungarian Securities and Stock Exchange Act VI 1990 
where the term 'Issue-broker' is used. By contrast, in Zambia, the Securities Act 1993 has no statutory 
provision providing for such labels as those found under section 59 of England's Criminal Justice Act 
1994. Thus, in Zambia the Christopher Case still applies.
40 Ibid.
41 See for example, section 59 of England's Criminal Justice Act 1994.
42 See paragraph 77 a) of the Hungarian Securities and Stock Exchange Act VI 1990.
43 For example, where company directors with inside information make omissions in listing particulars 
or prospectuses.
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in Zambia entails that the more the currency depreciates the greater the difficulty in proving 
the issue of 'materiality'. Illustratively, in the American case of Cady Roberts & Company,*4 
the principle in American securities law that a fact was material if it, if known, would 
affect the investment judgment of those with whom the insider was dealing was criticised 
by Commissioner Cary. He argued that this principle produced uncertainty and confusion. 
He, therefore, suggested the direct effect on the market value of securities as a test in addition 
to the 'investment judgment' principle. This dual test, however, does not establish certainty. 
For example, how is market value to be determined given a weak and fluctuating currency 
such as Zambia's?
Furthermore, the Zambian Securities Act 1993 does not define what constitutes 'knowledge'. 
Distinctions can be drawn here between various forms of knowledge.4 5 46In Selanghor v. 
Craddock (No.3),46 Ungoed-Thomas J. was of the view that 'knowledge' meant 'circumstances 
which would indicate to an honest reasonable man that such design was being committed, 
or would put him on inquiry'. In Re Montagu's Settlements,47 it was held that 'knowledge' is 
not confined to actual knowledge, but includes actual knowledge that would have been 
acquired but for shutting one's eye to the obvious, or willfully and recklessly failing to 
make such inquiries as a reasonable man would make.' Similarly, in Baden Delvaux and 
Lecuit v. Societe Generale, it was pointed out that:
. . . knowledge can comprise any one of five different mental states. . . : (i) actual 
knowledge; (ii) willfully shutting one's eye to the obvious; (iii) willfully and recklessly 
failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make; (iv) 
knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable 
man; (v) knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable 
man on inquiry.48 49
In contrast to the civil law position that has been spelt out above, the criminal law position 
was stated in Nelson v. Larholt49 where it was held that 'knowledge' meant more than 
constructive knowledge in the sense of shutting one's eyes to the obvious. In Warner v. 
DPP,50 Lord Reid held that knowledge could include 'willfully shutting one's eyes to the 
truth.' Willful, on the other hand, could mean deliberate or reckless acts or omissions.51 It 
is clear, however, that since section 52 of the Securities Act 1993 of Zambia provides only 
for criminal liability for the offence of insider dealing, the context in which the term 
'knowledge' must be understood here is the criminal law context.
44 40 SEC 907 at 911. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 401 F 2d 833.
45 For example see the distinction between 'knowing receipt and dealing' and 'knowing assistance' 
under trust law in G. Moffat, Trusts Law: Text and Materials (London: Butterworths: 1994), pp. 578-590 
and in J.G. Riddall, The Law of Trusts (London: Butterworths, 1996), pp. 434-439. In our work, we shall 
not labour on such distinctions.
46 11968] 2 All ER 1073.
47 [1987] Ch. 264 at 285.
48 Per Peter Gibson J., [1983] BCLC 325; See also El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings pic [1993] 3 All ER 717 at 
739; Polly Peck International Pic v. Nadir (No.2) [1992] 4 All ER 769; Karak Rubber Co Ltd v. Burden (No.2) 
[1972] 1 WLR 602 at 632; Agip (Africa) Ltd v. Jackson [1992] 4 All ER 385; Eagle Trust Pic v. SBC Securities 
Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 488 at 499; cf. Belmont Finance Corporation v. Williams Furniture Limited [1979] Ch 
250; Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v. Tan [1995] 3 All E.R. 97; Brinks Ltd v. Abu-Saleh (No.3) (1995) 
Times, 23 October; Birks [1989] Lloyd's MCLQ 296; Birks (1989) 105 LQR 352 at 355; Ricket (1991) 11 
OJLS 598 at 602; Powell v. Thompson [1991] 1 NZLR 597.
49 [1948] 1 KB. 339 at 344.
50 (1968) Cr. App. 373 at 398.
51 R v. Mays (1984) 79 Cr. App. 72. See also R v. Sinclair [1986] 1 WLR 1246.
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Does Insider Dealing Vitiate the Contract?
Under Zambian law, as a general rule, insider dealing cannot vitiate an investment contract.52 
By comparison, the position in the United Kingdom prior to the enactment of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1994 was illustrated in the case of Chase Manhattan Equities v. Goodman.53 In that 
case, Knox J. ruling on the legal consequences of insider dealing, proceeded:
. . .  The sale agreement is therefore . . .  unenforceable. . .  because it was tainted in its 
creation by an infringement.
In the United Kingdom, it is now provided in section 63(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1994 
that no contract shall be void by reason only of being tainted with insider dealing. It is 
clear that in Zambia, like in the United Kingdom under the Criminal Justice Act 1994, the 
Securities Act 1993 also provides that insider dealing cannot vitiate an investment contract. 
This means that both in Zambia and the United Kingdom the equitable remedy of rescission 
is generally not available to a party prejudiced by insider dealing.54 Be that as it may, a 
party prejudiced by inside information both in Zambia and the United Kingdom can bring 
an action for damages where he has suffered loss resulting from the defendant's negligence.55 
At common law, the burden of proof lies on the prejudiced party to prove that the defendant 
(who is the insider) owed the prejudiced party a duty of care and that the defendant breached 
that duty. The defendant's breach of duty must result in the plaintiff's loss.56 The difficulty, 
however, in bringing civil action against the insider dealer lies in the plaintiff proving that 
he or she actually suffered loss as a result of the defendant's action. Although the insider 
could have made an unfair gain from his transaction, it is not easy to say precisely which 
party has suffered loss from the transaction(s) of the insider.57 Should the buyer of the 
securities (the one who buys from the insider) bring an action against the insider claiming 
that the insider acted unfairly towards him or should the action be brought by the company 
that alloted the securities claiming that it has suffered a great loss as a result of the insider's 
action or should the action be commenced by the shareholders of the company that alloted 
the securities? Here, we are faced with an issue of law and fact. The facts of each case 
would determine which party has the locus standi to bring an action. It must, however, be 
reiterated that the importance of having clear statutory provisions on civil remedies for 
parties prejudiced by insider dealing lies in part in the fact that such remedies are an 
incentive to promoting investor confidence in the Zambian stock market.
Trustees as Insider Dealers and Conflict of Their Fiduciary Duties58
What happens where a person is a director of a company and he acquires inside information 
whilst at the same time acting as a trustee of a trust which holds shares in that company? 
The Zambian Securities Act 1993 says nothing on this. However, such a person finds himself
52 Securities Act 1993, sec. 52(3). '
53 [19911BCLC 897 at 934. For a discussion on insider dealing and the equitable remedy of rescission see 
B. Rider and L. French, The Regulation of Insider Trading (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 92.
54 See B. Rider and L. French, Ibid., p. 92.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 See generally Law Society (UK),The Law on Insider Dealing,MemorandumNo. 2 13 .1990;Ashe, "Insider 
Dealing", Company Lawyer, 11,(1990), 127; Naylor, 'The Use of Criminal Sanctions for Insider Trading", 
Company Lauryer, 11, (1990), 53; DTI (UK), The Law on Insider Dealing —  Consultative Document (1989).
58 For a detailed discussion see D. Parker and A. Mellows, The Modern Law of Trusts (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1983), pp. 327-328.
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in a position of conflict of duties. The prudent thing might be for such a person to resign 
his trusteeship since seeking independent advice would entail communicating information.
Is There any Need to Legislate Against Insider Dealing?
A number of studies have been undertaken on the economics of insider dealing.59 Arguments 
such as the hypotheses on weak form, semi-strong and strong form efficient markets have 
been advanced by several writers.60 It is, however, not our purpose in this section to 
regurgitate such information.
Suffice it to say, on the one hand, scholars such as Manne have argued that if directors or 
other insiders were permitted to trade on the basis of their inside knowledge, that would 
produce gradual adjustments in share prices on the market.61 The markets would react to 
increased buying or selling (which would then push the prices up or down) as the inside 
information gradually became public. On the other hand, Manne argues, there is likely to 
be a surge or drop in market prices once a public announcement is made of price-sensitive 
information that has hitherto been kept as a carefully guarded secret.62
One major shortcoming of Manne's theory is that it treats insiders as rational investors 
whose market behaviour is not affected by constraints or market imperfections such as 
transaction costs, agency costs and information costs. Furthermore, Manne does not address 
the impact of insider trading on investor confidence in the market. Ashe, like Manne, argues 
that there is little evidence to suggest that insider dealing in fact works against investor 
confidence.63 Ashe observes that the underlying factor behind the enactment of insider 
dealing laws is that markets to be successful depend as much on the flow of information as 
on the liquidity of dealing.64 Ashe challenges the basis of the argument that if potential 
investors in the market do not have equal access to information then the market will be 
seen as unfair and thus damaging to investor confidence. He submits, instead, that fairness 
is not necessarily the best basis for supporting insider dealing laws.65 There will be instances 
when there is unfairness on the market such as when one investor has more skill than 
another or when one investor does not have as much sophisticated research data as another. 
According to Ashe, it is therefore the public confidence argument which underscores the 
reasoning behind criminal sanctions for insider dealing — that for the public good the 
criminal law needs to intervene.66 Ashe's view that it is the public confidence argument 
which underscores the reasoning behind criminal sanctions for insider dealing has its own
59 See for example H.V. Roberts, "Statistical versus Clinical Prediction of the Stock Market," unpublished 
paper presented to the Seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices, University of Chicago, May 1967; 
R.R. Pettit, "Dividend Announcements, Security Performance, and Capital Markets Efficiency," 27 
Journal of Finance, (December 1972), pp. 993-1007; G. Foster, "Stock Market Reaction To Estimates Per 
Share By Company Officials," Journal of Accounting Research, (Spring 1973), pp. 25-27; E.F. Fama, 
"Efficient Capital Markets; A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," 25 Journal of Finance, (May 
1970), pp. 383-417. See also R. A. Brealey and S.C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 4th edition, 
(New York; McGraw-Hill, 1991), pp. 290-310; E.W. Davis and J. Pointon, op. cit., pp. 319,320,321 and 
325.
60 See generally Ibid.
61 See generally H.G. Manne, Insider Dealing And The Stock Market (New York: Free Press, 1966).
62 See generally Ibid.
63 See T.M. Ashe, op. cit., p. 127.
64 Ibid., p. 127.
65 Ibid., p. 127.
66 Ibid., pp. 127-128.
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shortcomings. The argument overlooks the importance of civil sanctions for insider dealing 
and thus does not address the protection of property rights of victims of insider dealing.
In a 1985 study, 'Insider Trading And The Exploitation Of Inside Information', it was 
observed that activities of insiders in fact sustained investor confidence in the market 
because insiders are seen as leading indicators while others follow.67 This view has its own 
shortcomings too. Every market has its own distinct micro and macro-economic factors 
that could affect investor confidence and behaviour on the market. Indeed, one South 
African study shows that:
. . .  the witnesses have been unanimous in the condemnation of insider dealing in all 
its forms.68
Although this South African study does not document the reasons behind the mass 
condemnation, the study illustrates that not always will other investors follow behind 
insider investors. Thus, the 'insider-signalling' theory has its limitations.
Other theories that try to explain why insider dealing should be legislated against include 
the 'misappropriation' theory.69 Under the misappropriation theory, non-public price- 
sensitive information is regarded as a valuable commodity which is the property or akin to 
the property of a company.70
The information does not belong to the individuals who make up the company. It is 
therefore inequitable and akin to theft for those individuals to make use of that 
information for their own gain. This theory does not require any loss to have been 
suffered in real terms —  the offensive behaviour is seen as the unjustifiable gain or 
avoidance of loss. This equation of insider trading with misappropriation is perhaps 
the strongest argument in favour of criminal sanctions.71
The misappropriation theory, like other theories discussed above, has its own shortcomings. 
How do we prove, for example, elements of the offence of insider dealing if both the offence 
and the transactions must be treated together as constituting the actus reus? This makes 
proof of all of the elements of an offence to the criminal standard very difficult.
The 'fairness and confidence in the market' theory, discussed by Ashe,72 rests on the view 
that if, of two potential players in a market, one has price-sensitive information available 
and the other has not, that is unfair.73 Unfairness here is seen to lead to loss of confidence. 
This theory is sometimes taken together with the misappropriation theory. When this 
happens, proponents of the 'hybrid' theory may or may not assert that the 'victims' suffer 
loss as opposed to making a profit.74
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the efficacy of the law on insider dealing in Zambia and Hungary. 
A critique of the relevant statutory provisions has been made and a number of problem
4
67 See Ibid., p. 128. See also P. Kibuchi, The Legal Aspects of Public Distribution of Securities in Kenya, 
unpublished LL.M dissertation (Coventry: University of Warwick, 1997), p. 21.
68 See B. Rider, 'The Regulation of Insider Dealing in the Republic of South Africa", South African Law 
Journal, Vol. 94 (1977), p. 437.
69 See J. Dine, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
70 Ibid., p. 57.
71 Ibid., p. 57.
72 See above.
73 See J. Dine, op. cit., p. 58.
74 See Ibid., p. 58.
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areas have been identified. Reference has been made to securities law in the United 
Kingdom. Furthermore, we have provided important reasons that explain why there are 
some flaws in the statutory provisions governing the law on insider dealing in Zambia. 
Important recommendations have been made to redress some of these shortcomings.
The importance of examining the efficacy of the law on insider dealing in countries such as 
Zambia and Hungary can be appreciated against the backdrop of concepts such as market 
efficiency. The essence of an efficient stock market is that any information relevant to the 
company is fully and immediately absorbed in its share price.75 Most of the market efficiency 
tests that have been carried out on emerging stock markets indicate that emerging markets 
do not fall into the category of weak-form market efficiency.76 Besides, despite some of the 
anomalies that are characteristic of these markets, emerging markets cannot by that fact 
alone be said to be inefficient. Some of the anomalies of these markets may indicate, instead, 
that asset pricing models on which they are based are inadequate.77 A number of studies 
have been undertaken on the market efficiency of emerging stock markets.78 These studies 
show, for example, that the pricing mechanisms of these markets are usually affected by 
the volume of trade in securities on a particular day or in a particular season.79 There is, 
nonetheless, limited similarities between the seasonalities in developed country stock 
markets and that in emerging stock markets. The reason for this view is simple. Emerging 
stock markets, like developed country stock markets, have their distinct institutional 
characteristics. Also, emerging markets are relatively segmented and have until recently 
not been adequately integrated with each other and with developed country stock markets.
Although there has not been any conviction of insider dealers in Zambia, it would be wrong 
to argue that there is no need to legislate against insider dealing in Zambia. There arc 
several factors which could explain, for example, why in many countries there have been 
few insider dealing prosecutions and convictions. Reasons include the view that there is 
need to have special juries in financial fraud cases. Such juries are to be constituted by 
experts in the relevant field in which the financial crime falls so as to overcome the problem 
of trying sophisticated financial fraud cases in ordinaiy courts of law. Our contribution to
75 See E.W. Davis and J. Pointon, op.cit., p.320.
76 See C.B. Barry and L.J. Lockwood, "New Directions in Research on Emerging Capital Markets," 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, Vol. 4, No. 5 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), p. 
21. On the meaning of the term 'market efficiency', see R.A. Brealey and S.C. Myers, Principles of 
Corporate Finance (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1991), p. 290. R. A. Brealey and S.C. Myers observe: "When 
economists say that the security market is efficient, they are not talking about whether the filing is 
up-to-date or whether desktops are tidy. They mean that information is widely and cheaply available 
to investors and that all relevant and ascertainable information is already reflected in security prices." 
The concept of efficient markets is a by-product of a chance discovery on how stock and commodity 
prices behave. In other words, prices of securities on an efficient market follow a random loalk.
77 See M.T. Porter, "Closed-end Emerging Country Funds Review," in K.H. Park and W. Van Agtmael, 
(eds), The World's Emerging Stock Markets (Chicago: Probus Publishers, 1993), p. 21.
78 For an elaborate read on the semi-strong form tests of emerging markets see for example, M. Herrera 
and L.J. Lockwood, 'The Size Effect in the Mexican Stock Market," Journal of Banking and Finance, 18, 
(1994), 621-632.
79 See for example R. Aggarwal and P. Rivoli, "Seasonal and Day-of-the-Week Effects in Four Emerging 
Stock Markets," Financial Review Studies 1, (1988), 541-550; M. Gultekin and N.B. Guitekin, "Stock 
Market Seasonality: International Evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, 12, (1983) 469-481; S. 
Claessens, S. Dasgupta and J. Glen, "Return Behaviour in Emerging Markets," World Bank Economic 
Review, 9, (1995), 131-151; A. Corhay, G. Hawawini and P. Michel, "Seasonality in the Risk-Return 
Relationship: Some International Evidence," Journal of Finance, 42, (1987), 49-68.
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the general body of knowledge on corporate law in Zambia and Hungary must be 
appreciated in this light. This is an important recommendation for strengthening the law 
on insider dealing in Zambia and in many other jurisdictions. In the main, this work is a 
step forward in interpreting the law on insider dealing both in Zambia and Hungary. Indeed, 
the work provides a critical appraisal of the law on which policy recommendations can be 
grounded to improve insider dealing law for emerging markets and thus lead towards 
efficient markets. If investor protection is to be promoted on emerging markets such as the 
Lusaka Stock Exchange, investors must be afforded the opportunity to participate fairly in 
trade on the stock market. A self-regulatory system that allows all market players to have 
equal and timely access to information on the Lusaka Stock Exchange is an important 
mechanism for promoting investor confidence in Zambia.
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